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The imposition of universal coverage and uniform pricing constraints, as part
of the universal service obligations, makes the universal service provider
less aggressive in the price game when it competes with a rm that does
not cover the whole set of markets (Valletti et al., 2002). In this paper,
we fully characterize the resulting price equilibrium when universal service
obligations are imposed. With a limited market coverage by the entrant or a
small degree of degree of product dierentiation, the equilibrium is a mixed
strategy one.
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11 Introduction
Along with the deregulation of most of the former public monopolies comes
the question of universal service obligations (hereafter USO). How should
we dene USO? What are the costs of USO (Panzar, 2000, Rodriguez and
Storer, 2000) and how should they be nanced (Chon e et al., 2002, Mirabel
et al., 2009)? Which rms should be subject to USO (Hoernig, 2006)? What
are the consequences of USO in the context of deregulation? These questions
are at the heart of quite a vivid debate, both in the scientic and political
cenacles. In the present paper, we aim at contributing to this debate by
focusing on the last of the above mentioned questions. More precisely we
oer an in-depth analysis of the nature of price competition in a deregulated
industry subject to USO.
Valletti et al. (2002) underline the fact that whenever USO involve a
constraint of uniform pricing, this constraint deeply alters the nature of price
competition. More precisely, a uniform pricing constraint creates a strategic
link between otherwise segmented markets and induces a less aggressive
pricing pattern by the incumbent. Since prices are strategic complements,
equilibrium prices tend to increase overall and this in turn is likely to aect
the extent of entry by incoming rms. Anton et al. (2002) establish a
comparable result under quantity competition.
The argument is best summarized as follows. Think of a reference in-
dustry consisting of a collection of segmented submarkets (typically, the in-
dustry for postal services, with submarkets corresponding to delivery routes
in dierent geographical areas). Suppose then that the historical incumbent
is challenged by an entrant on a limited number of submarkets. Assume
further that USO constrain the incumbent's behavior: it must oer its ser-
vices in all submarkets, at a uniform price. At the price competition stage,
the incumbent's behavior is aected by the extent of the entrant's market
coverage. If the entrant is a low scale competitor, the incumbent rm is
better o setting a price close to the monopoly price in which case it enjoys
near monopoly prots on the (relatively numerous) protected markets but
possibly sells very little - or nothing- on the contested ones. If the entrant
covers a larger set of submarkets, the incumbent is better o being more
aggressive over the whole set of submarkets. In which case the prots lost
on the protected markets are compensated by larger sales on the (relatively
numerous) contested ones. Hence, by choosing the number of submarkets it
challenges, the entrant controls the aggressiveness of the incumbent. Prices
therefore decrease with the entrant's coverage (Valletti et al., lemma 1). For
that reason, the entrant will strategically limit its entry scale.
2As acknowledged by Valletti et al. (2002), this analysis is correct as long
as the products sold by the incumbent and the entrant are suciently dif-
ferentiated. In a more general analysis, we cannot exclude however that the
incumbent's price best reply leaves him with no sales at all on the contested
markets. It is then as if he withdrew on the protected ones. In these mar-
kets indeed it can charge the monopoly price and collect the corresponding
monopoly prots. This strategy turns to be particularly attractive when
competition is erce on the contested markets (for example because prod-
ucts are close substitutes) and insulated markets are relatively numerous.
Taking this strategy into account may destroy the above pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. In other words, an almost immediate consequence of USO is ac-
tually to question the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSE).
The possible lack of existence of PSE originates in the possibility for the in-
cumbent to retreat on those markets which are not challenged by the entrant
where it still benets from a monopoly position. Taking this strategy into
account makes the incumbent even softer in the price game than previously
acknowledged.
In this paper, we assume that rms sell dierentiated products and com-
pete in prices. We show that for each possible market coverage possibly
chosen by the entrant, there exists a degree of product dierentiation be-
low which the PSE does not exist. Unsurprisingly, the larger the extent
of market coverage, the smaller the degree of dierentiation below which a
PSE fails to exist.1 Then, we establish that when the existence of a PSE is
problematic, a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE) always exists. Moreover,
we show that all prices in the support of the mixed strategies are strictly
above those prices corresponding to the pure strategy candidate. Finally,
we develop an example where we make the entrant's coverage endogenous
and we show that at the optimal coverage, the resulting equilibrium in the
price game is the mixed strategy one. In other words, USO indeed induce
the entrant to control for the aggressiveness of the incumbent by limiting its
coverage but this limitation is very likely to induce mixed equilibrium pric-
ing. Since prices in a mixed equilibrium are strictly above the pure strategy
ones, we may argue that the conclusions derived from models where the
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium has been assumed systematically
underestimate the negative consequences of USO on competition.
Finally, let us stress that the point we raise in this paper should not be
viewed as a technical curiosity. To avoid the discontinuity in the incum-
1In the limit case where rms sell homogeneous products, a pure strategy equilibrium
never exists (Hoernig, 2002)
3bent's reaction function, one needs that products are so dierentiated that
the incumbent faces a positive demand at the monopoly price even if the
competitor's good is available for free. Products like bulk mails, telecom-
munication services or energy are clearly not that dierentiated. Moreover,
in those markets, connecting consumers is costly2 and, therefore, entrants
do not necessarily cover the whole territory. Hence, the possibility of a MSE
must be considered in all these industries.
Moreover, in these markets, consumers typically rely on a unique provider,
at which they possibly buy several units, i.e. markets where beneting from
the service requires a form a aliation and where there is no real benets
to be obtained from multiple aliations. The Hotelling's location model is
particularly well suited to model the discrete consumer's choice of an alia-
tion (See, for example, Laont, Rey and Tirole (1998) for an application to
telecommunication markets). In section 4, we develop an example based on
the Hotelling set-up where there is no demand expansion after market open-
ing. We show that, if the entrant's coverage is endogenous, the equilibrium
in the price game is a MSE.
Likewise, in vertically dierentiated product models, if, at some prices,
the universal service provider is completely excluded from some local sub-
markets3 then withdrawing on the protected market with the monopoly
price is an attractive option for the incumbent. In such a case, the only
valid equilibrium is the MSE.
2 Model and Benchmark Results
2.1 The Model
There is a continuum of identical local markets indexed by j, j 2 [0;N].
USO consist of two constraints: a universal coverage constraint (UC) and
an uniform price constraint (UP). If USO are imposed on the incumbent,
rm I, this rm must serve all the markets at a uniform price pi. The entrant,
rm E, is not constrained by USO and serves a subset of the N markets at
price pe. Let ne denote the index of the last market rm E has decided to
compete in. The complete set of markets can thus be decomposed into two
subsets: the set [0;ne] of contested markets and the complement [ne;N] of
insulated ones.
2High connection costs justify the imposition of the universal coverage constraint.
3Armstrong (2008) develops a stylized postal model where the incumbent may loose
all its clients in one region after market opening.
4We assume that rm I and E sell dierentiated products; they compete
simultaneously in prices, taking ne > 0 as given. Production costs are nor-
malized to zero. Denote by xD
k (pi;pe) the (duopoly) demand addressed to
rm k = i;e in each of the contested markets. We also dene a monopoly
demand for each of the two rms, which we denote by xM
k (pk). This demand
is obviously relevant for the incumbent in the insulated markets but may
also be relevant in contested markets whenever price dierentials are such
that the non-negativity constraint on xD
k (:) binds for one rm. These de-
mands are assumed to be well behaved. In particular, there exists a unique
well-dened monopoly solution and, in case of duopoly, goods are demand
substitutes.
All costs are normalized to zero. The prot of rm k = i;e on a market
j is D
k (pi;pe) = pkxD
k (pi;pe) or M
k = pkxM
k (pk) depending on whether rm
k faces the duopoly or the monopoly demand on market j.4
2.2 Price competition without USO
Suppose rst that there is no universal service constraint applying. Firm I
can therefore price discriminate between insulated and contested markets.
On the former, rm I applies the monopoly price pm
i  argmaxpi M
i (pi).
On the latter, each rm sets the prot maximizing prices. Optimal behavior











Under suitable regularity assumptions on demand functions, these best reply
functions are continuous and monotone. Let us further assume that there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium (p1
i ;p1
e ) given by the solution to: fpi =
1
i(pe); pe = 1
e(pi)g. Without USO, the monopoly price pm
i prevails on the
insulated markets and equilibrium prices (p1
i ;p1
e ) applies on the contested
ones. Customers in contested markets therefore face lower prices and a
greater choice of products.
4Imposing USO is relevant when there are markets that otherwise would not be served.
Usually this amounts to assume that serving a market j involves a xed cost g(j) and that
there are unprotable markets: for some j 2 [0;N], @p such that 
M(p)   g(j)  0. As
we concentrate mainly on the analysis of the price game, we will abstract from these xed
costs in the formal analysis.
53 Price competition with USO
Without USO, the incumbent's prot is additively separable between the ne
contested markets and the remaining (N   ne) insulated ones. This is no
longer true under USO. The uniform pricing constraint creates a strategic
link between the two types of markets because increasing market shares in
the contested segment by decreasing the price involves an opportunity cost
corresponding to those prots which are lost through this price decrease
on the insulated markets. The characterization of a Nash equilibrium in
prices is more involved because of this trade-o. We therefore develop the
analysis in two steps. First, we (informally) discuss the structure of the
incumbent's prot function under USO and explain why this structure leads
to the possible non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Second, we
formally derive the shape of best reply correspondences and equilibria.
 Step 1:
Notice that, whatever pe, the incumbent is always able to secure the
monopoly prots on the insulated markets. In other words, rm I's MinMax
payo equals to (N   ne)M
i (pm
i ). Notice also that pm
i denes the upper
bound for the price that the incumbent could possibly play in equilibrium.
Assume rst that prices are such that each rm faces a positive demand
in the contested markets while the incumbent is a monopolist in the insulated
ones. The prot functions are dened by:
i(pi;pe) = (N   ne)M




In price constellations for which demands are strictly positive, the best
reply functions compute as i(pe;ne)  argmaxpi i(pi;pe) and e(pi;ne) 
argmaxpe e(pi;pe) = 1
e(pi). Both D
i and M
i are concave in pi so that
they are each characterized by a unique local maximum: 1
i(pe) and pm
i
respectively. Moreover, we have that 1
i(pe)  pm
i . The best reply dened
over their weighted sum i(:) therefore exists and is unique. Moreover, this
best reply involves price "bracketing": 8ne 2 [0;N], 1
i(:)  i(:)  pm
i .
The unique Nash equilibrium (p
i;p
e) in the price game obtains as the
solution to fpi = i(pe;ne);pe = 1
e(pe)g. Notice further that the entrant's
behavior is unaected by its market coverage while the incumbent behaves
more aggressively when ne increases: di=dne < 0. Since prices are strategic
complements, it follows that equilibrium prices decrease as the entrant's
market coverage increases.
The analysis just performed partly replicates the analysis proposed by
Valletti et al., (2002). This analysis however is partly misleading. It fails
6indeed to explicitly consider the case where the incumbent, when naming
its monopoly price pm
i actually retreats on the insulated markets because,
given pi its demand is exactly zero on the contested ones (i.e. the non-
negativity constraint on xD
i (:) is strictly binding). When this is the case,
the incumbent enjoys its MinMax payo. As a matter of fact, this MinMax
strategy might well be the incumbent's best reply against some relevant level
of prices pe.
More precisely, let us denote by ^ pi(pe) the solution to equation xD
i (^ pi;pe) =
0, i.e. ^ pi(pe) denes the critical price above which the incumbent faces no
demand on the contested markets. Then, given pe, the payos of the incum-




i (pi) + neD
i (pi;pe) if pi  ^ pi(pe)
(N   ne)M
i (pi) if pi  ^ pi(pe)
(5)
In this case, the incumbent's payo is not globally concave anymore.
Figure 1 illustrates this point. There are two local maximizers i(:) and pm
i .
The extent to which the rst maximizer dominates the second obviously
depends on the extent of market coverage, i.e. on ne. More fundamentally,
the lack of concavity is likely to destroy the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium.
Notice that a sucient condition ensuring that this lack of concavity is
not problematic consists in assuming that xD
i (pm
i ;0) > 0. In this case indeed,
the non-negativity constraint cannot be binding in the relevant domain of
prices: since rm I will never quote a price above the monopoly price while
rm E will not sell at loss. Valletti et al. (2002) implicitly assume that this
condition is satised, which indeed can be interpreted on as putting a lower
bound on the degree of product dierentiation. In the analysis to follow we
do not make such an assumption.
 Step 2: Once the lack of concavity in the incumbent's payo is ac-
knowledged, it follows that the incumbent's best reply could be either the
monopoly price pm
i or the local best reply i(:) computed along the rst
branch of the prot function.
To characterize rm I's best reply, we must compare the payos along
the two proles:
neD
i (i;pe) + (N   ne)M
i (i) = (N   ne)M
i (pm
i ) (6)




i (i;pe) + M
















i + (N   ne)M
i
    
Figure 1: Non-concavity in the payo of rm I
Because of strategic complementarity, the left-hand side of the equation is
continuous and strictly increasing in pe in the relevant domain whereas the
right-hand side is constant. Moreover M
i (i)  M
i (pm
i ). Accordingly, there
exists at most one solution to the above equation. Let us denote this solution
by ~ pe, i.e. ~ pe denes the critical level of price for the entrant such that the
incumbent is exactly indierent between retreating on the insulated markets
or being aggressive throughout. Obviously, for pe > ~ pe, the incumbent is
strictly better o being aggressive and challenges the entrant on all the ne
contested markets while for pe < ~ pe, the incumbent is strictly better o
securing its MinMax payo and withdrawing on the insulated markets.




i if pe  ~ pe
i(pe;ne) if pe  ~ pe
(7)
Since pm
i  i( ~ pe;ne), the best reply correspondence exhibits a down-
ward discontinuity at ~ pe.
As for the entrant's behavior, two strategy proles are a priori possible.
It can either compete with the incumbent on all contested markets or it can
choose to quote a limit price, i.e. the highest possible price guaranteeing a
monopoly position on the contested markets. The rst strategy corresponds
to pe = 1
e(pi), the second one to a limit price pL
e dened as the solution
8of xD
i (pi;pe) = 0. The second strategy applies whenever the non negativity
constraint is binding for rm I at prices 1
e(pi). The entrant's best reply





There are a priori two pure strategy equilibrium candidates. First, there is
the interior equilibrium candidate (p
i;p
e) where the incumbent challenges
the entrant on all markets. Second, there is a "monopoly" equilibrium can-
didate, where the incumbent withdraws on the insulated markets and the
entrant uses limit pricing to retain a monopoly position on the challenged
markets, with prices pm
i and pL
e (pm
i ) respectively. It is immediate to estab-
lish that the second candidate can be ruled out whenever the equilibrium
monopoly price is interior, i.e. whenever the monopoly payo function is
dierentiable at pm
i .5 In this case indeed, at pm
i , the derivative of the pay-
os on the insulated markets is zero whereas it is strictly negative on the
contested ones. As a consequence, rm i's best reply must be i(pL
e ;ne).
We are then left with a unique interior pure strategy equilibrium candidate.
Because rm's I best reply is discontinuous, this equilibrium may not be a
valid candidate either, as shown though the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Whenever p
e < ~ pe there exists no pure strategy equilibrium
This result is obvious when referring to Figure 2: if the downward jump
occurs for a price ~ pe > p
e, then the pure strategy best reply of I against p
e
is pm
i . Accordingly, the pure strategy equilibrium does not exist.
The non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium nicely summarizes the
implication of USO on price competition. Suppose the entrant is very ag-
gressive and names quite a low price. The incumbent is tempted to exploit
its monopoly power over the insulated markets by naming the monopoly
price. If this is the case, then the entrant should raise its price because
competition is less erce on the contested markets. But this, in turn, makes
aggressiveness a protable deviation for the incumbent. Because the incum-
bent is not allowed to price discriminate, these two opposite forces cannot
equilibrate and price competition is fundamentally unstable.














































Figure 2: Non existence of a PSE
Lemma 2 When a pure strategy does not exist, there always exists a mixed
strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, average prices are strictly larger
than the pure strategy equilibrium candidate (p
i;p
e).
Proof: We prove this Lemma in two steps. First, as for the existence of a
mixed strategy equilibrium, notice that because of product dierentiation,
rms' payos are continuous so that applying Glicksberg (1952)'s theorem,
there always exists an equilibrium. In order to prove the second part of the
Lemma let us denote by fFk;[p 
k ;p+
k )]g the equilibrium strategy of rm k.
Suppose, contrary to the Lemma that given p 
e , the lowest price named by
rm i in equilibrium satises p 
i < i(p 
e ). Then rm i's payo must be
strictly increasing at (p 
i ;p 
e ). But since p 
e is the lowest price named by
rm e in equilibrium, the same conclusion must hold for any other possible
realization of the mixed strategy (p 
i ;pe). This obviously implies that p 
i is
not part of rm i's equilibrium strategy. Since the exact same argument can
be made regarding rm E's lowest price against p 
i , we can conclude that in
equilibrium p 
k  k(p 
 k) for k = i;e. Notice then that this condition can




From the above Lemma, it follows that either the equilibrium is the
pure strategy one or if the pure strategy equilibrium does not exist, a non
10degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium exists in which the pure strategies
belonging to the support of equilibrium prices are larger than p
k. As a
consequence, average prices realized in equilibrium are strictly above p
k.
We have therefore established the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The pure strategy equilibrium candidate (p
i;p
e) denes a
lower bound to the level of prices named with positive probability in equilib-
rium.
Notice that at this step, we do not have characterized a mixed strategy
equilibrium of the game. This is a notoriously dicult task, which lies
outside the scope of the present article. Nevertheless, we provide such a
characterization for a simple example in the next section.6
3.2 Existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
Equilibrium in the price game is either the pure strategy equilibrium or the
mixed-strategy equilibrium with associated higher prices. It is therefore im-
portant to discuss which equilibrium applies. The answer to this question
depends on the entrant's market coverage and the degree of product dif-
ferentiation. When products are suciently dierentiated, the PSE exists
(Valletti et al., 2002 and Hoernig, 2006) while, for homogenous products, the
unique equilibrium is the MSE whenever the incumbent has a strictly posi-
tive MinMax payo (Hoernig, 2002). Our aim is to identify the equilibrium
for all possible degrees of product dierentiation and coverage.
Let us assume that we can measure the degree of product dierentiation
by a parameter  2 [;], with the lower bound corresponding to homoge-
nous products and the higher bound to independent demands. We already
established that a PSE always exists whenever xD
i (pm
i ;0) > 0 which implic-
itly denes a lower bound on  above which existence is non-problematic.
The following proposition characterizes the type of equilibrium prevailing
for each possible value of  and ne.
Proposition 2 (i) For each ne 2 (0;N), there exists a degree of product
dierentiation ~  <  such that for   ~ , the PSE fails to exist. (ii) ~  is
decreasing in ne.
Proof: The PSE fails to exist whenever p
e  ~ pe. Consider any given
ne 2 (0;N). When the degree of product dierentiation  varies, the equi-
librium and the cut-o prices vary in opposite direction:
@p
e
@ > 0 and
6Hoernig (2002) provides a characterization for the case of price competition with
homogeneous goods.
11@~ pe
@ < 0. Moreover, when products are almost homogeneous, we have
p
e < ~ pe: lim! p
e = 0 and lim! ~ pe > 0. Combined with the fact that
whenever xD
i (pm
i ;0) > 0 the corresponding equilibrium is the PSE, we have
proven part (i).
We have thus identied a locus ~ (ne) characterized by p
e(~ (ne);ne) =
~ pe(~ (ne);ne). For a given , when ne > ~  1(ne), the corresponding equilib-
rium is the PSE. As a matter of fact, both p
e and ~ pe are decreasing in ne
and limne!N p
e = p1
e > limne!N ~ pe = pL
e (pm
i )). Therefore, for a given ,
the MSE applies for the lowest coverage and the PSE for the highest one.
This proves that the locus ~ (ne) is decreasing in ne.
Proposition 2 identies for all possible degrees of product dierentia-
tion and for all possible coverage the corresponding equilibrium in the price
game. Figure 3 illustrates the proposition. The PSE does not exist when
the incumbent's MinMax payo is high (low coverage by the entrant) and
when competition is erce (little product dierentiation). And, when the
coverage increases (and thus, the incumbent's MinMax payo decreases),











Figure 3: Equilibrium type in the price game
So far, we have considered that the entrant' coverage was exogenous.
Valletti et al. (2002) show that when the entrant decides on its market
coverage, a uniform price constraint induces a lower ne. The reason is that a
higher coverage intensies competition and therefore reduces the equilibrium
prices. It is immediate to show that the prot on each covered market j




@ne < 0. Hence, the
marginal benet of increasing market coverage is smaller than e(p
e;p
i).
Equilibrium coverage will be such that, on the last covered market, the
marginal benet equals the xed cost of serving the market. Therefore, the
entrant realizes a strictly positive prot on the last covered market, a result
that would not be true absent the uniform pricing constraint.
12Does a similar result continue to hold true when the MSE is considered?
Since we do not characterize the mixed equilibrium in the general set-up, we
are not able to answer this question formally. Decreasing market coverage
leads to higher prices in equilibrium since the support of the mixed strategy
equilibrium shifts up. This is likely to drive equilibrium prots up but we
cannot prove this because we have no idea about the impact of decreasing
market coverage on the equilibrium probability distributions.
In order to address the optimal coverage issue, we now develop an exam-
ple where closed forms solutions can be computed. In this example, we show
that the entrant's optimal coverage induces a pricing subgame in which only
mixed strategy equilibria exist.
4 Application to Hotelling Competition
4.1 The model
At each market j 2 [0;N], consumers' type x are uniformly distributed in
the [0;1] interval according to their idiosyncratic taste. The indirect utility
derived from a consumer with type x, buying a product k is given by
U(x) = S   td(x;k)   pj
where d(x;k) is a measure of the distance between the product's character-
istic and type x's ideal product. If the consumer does not buy any product,
U(x) = 0.
The incumbent sells a product with type x = 0 at a constant marginal
cost 0. Firm I is subject to USO and covers all the N markets at a uniform
price pi. The entrant possibly sells at price pe a product with type x = 1
produced at a constant marginal cost 0. The entrant rst decides on its
market coverage ne 2 [0;N]. Then rms compete in prices.
We make the assumption that a monopolist will serve all the consumers.




expression is maximized for pi = S
2. We shall assume that S > 2t. As a
result, the monopoly price on each market is a corner solution: pm
i = S  t.
The monopoly price leaves the consumer located at a distance 1 from the
monopolist indierent between buying and not buying. This assumption is
perfectly in line with the literature on Hotelling competition, which most
often assumes full coverage by assuming that S is large enough.
Notice that this assumption of monopoly market coverage amounts to
assume that no market expansion eect is expected as a result of compe-
tition. All of the market shares gained by the entrant are taken from the
13incumbent (the displacement ratio is equal to 1). As shown hereafter, this
particular feature of the model reinforces that strategic value attached by
the entrant to a voluntary limitation of the market coverage.
4.2 Price competition without USO
Let us consider rst that the incumbent is allowed to price discriminate
between contested and insulated markets. On the ne contested markets,
standard Hotelling competition takes places. Given consumers' preferences,
the indierent consumer is dened by ~ x =
t pi+pe
2t and rms I and E face a
















The Nash equilibrium in the contested market is dened as the solution to
(9) and (10): p1
i = t = p1
e . In the remaining N ne markets, rm I remains
as a monopolist and charge the monopoly price pm
i .7
4.3 Price competition with USO
Under USO, the incumbent faces a positive demand on the contested markets
whenever pi  pe + t. The prot of rm I denes as follow:
i(pi;pe) =

(N   ne)pi if pi  pe + t
(N   ne)pi + nepi~ x if pi  pe + t
(11)




i = S   t if pe  ~ pe
i(pe;ne) = t( N
ne   1) +
pe+t
2 if pe  ~ pe
(12)










Notice that, for a coverage close to zero, the price dened by i(:) tends to
increase exponentially. In which case consumers will stop buying and the
7When the xed costs per market are all zero, the entrant would therefore covers all
the N markets. When there are xed costs of serving a market j, the coverage will be
such that the net prot realized by E on the last covered market is zero.
14demand would no longer be equal to ~ x. Hence, the corresponding best reply
must be computed as the solution to U(~ x) = 0 i.e. there is a third branch
in (12) that applies against the highest values of pe. Notice nally that in
the present set-up, we also have that pL
e (pi) = pi   t.
The prot realized by the entrant when it covers ne markets is given by:
e(pi;pe) =

nepe if pe  pi   t
nepe(1   ~ x) if pe  pi   t
(13)




Depending on the entrant's coverage, there are three possible equilibrium
congurations: two pure strategies equilibrium, (pm
i ;pL
e (pm
i ))8 and (p
i;p
e)
and the mixed strategy equilibrium.
The rst candidate is dened by (pi = pm
i = S t; pe = pL
e (pm
i ) = S 2t)
in which case the incumbent monopolizes the protected markets and the
entrant monopolizes the challenged markets with a limit price. A necessary
condition for this candidate to be a valid one is that i(pe = S   2t;ne) 
S   t. This condition is satised whenever ne < n 
e = 2tN
S+t. A second
necessary condition is that 1
e(S   t)  S   2t, i.e the entrant's best reply
against S t is not dened by the interior solution. This condition is satised
whenever S  4t. When these two conditions are satised, (S   t;S   2t)
denes a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium is unique.9
The second candidate equilibrium in pure strategies can be identied by


















This equilibrium applies whenever p
e  ~ pe (lemma 1). This inequality de-
nes a critical number of local markets n+
e above which the competitive pure
strategy equilibrium exists (see gure 3). Formally n+







N2(S   t)( 3 + 3S   t(7 + t)) + N(9 + 18S   t(18 + t))))
(9 + 72S + ( 78 + t)t))
8This equilibrium potentially exists because the monopoly price p
m
i is a corner solution.
9It is indeed immediate to show that the two pure strategy equilibrium candidates are
mutually exclusive.
15For intermediate value of ne 2 [n 
e ;n+
e ] no pure strategy equilibrium
exists. However, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists because payos are
continuous (see lemma 2). Since only one of the two rms is subject to
USO, it is natural to consider a candidate mixed strategy equilibrium in
which only this rm uses a non-degenerate mixed strategy. Notice indeed
that the kind of non-concavity in payos which results from USO (see gure
1) is present only in the incumbent's payo function. In such an equilibrium,
the incumbent randomizes over two prices: p+
i = pm
i with probability  and
p 
i = i( ~ pe;ne) with probability 1   . The probability is chosen to ensure
that playing the pure strategy ~ pe is indeed a best reply for rm E.10
Depending on the entrant's coverage, one of the following mutually ex-





e ], the mixed strategy equilibrium for ne 2 [n 
e ;n+
e ] and the inte-
rior equilibrium (p
i;p
e) for ne 2 [n+
e ;N].
4.4 Coverage by the entrant
From equilibrium payos in the pricing game, it is direct to show that prices
and the prot realized by the entrant in each covered market are weakly
decreasing in ne (and strictly decreasing for ne  n 
e ). Therefore the entrant
has strategic reasons to limit its market coverage. The following proposition
establishes that, when coverage is endogenous and when there are no xed
costs of serving markets, the optimal coverage is such that the resulting
price equilibrium is the mixed strategy one. If serving markets is costly, it
will decrease further the entrant's coverage. Hence, in our example where
local markets are represented by an Hotelling line, the interior equilibrium
is never the relevant one.
Proposition 3 The optimal coverage by the entrant n




Proof: (1) For ne 2 [0;n 
e ], the entrant's prot ne(S 2t) is strictly increas-
ing in ne. (2) For ne 2 [n+
e ;N], the entrant's prot nep
e(1   ~ x) is strictly
decreasing in ne. (3) The entrant's payo is continuous in ne. In particular,
we have limne!n+
e  = 0 (since at n+
e , p





Therefore, the highest payo will be reached for a ne in [n 
e ;n+
e ].
To illustrate, assume that N = 1, S = 5, t = 1. Assuming that when
a pure strategy does not exist, the mixed strategy equilibrium sees rm
10To the best of our knowledge, the structure of this equilibrium has been analyzed rst
by Krishna (1989) and developed afterwards in various contexts, see for instance Boccard
and Wauthy (2003) for an application in the context of a Hotelling model.






Figure 4: Entrant's equilibrium payos as a function of ne
I mixing over two atoms and rm E playing a pure strategy, we obtain
n 
e ' 0;33, n+
e ' 0;83 and n
e ' 0:45. The entrant covers 45% of the
markets. Figure 4 illustrates this numerical simulation and proposition 3.
Notice that in the present setup, the strategic eect of limited coverage
is particularly neat: when limiting its market coverage, the entrant relaxes
price competition which positively aects local prots and therefore possibly
compensates for the smaller number of covered markets. But in addition,
the equilibrium price dierential between the incumbent and the entrant
also increases. Since the displacement ration is equal to 1 (i.e. the market
is fully covered), this implies that rm E's market share increases in all of
the contested markets. This second eect clearly pushes incentives towards
a more limited coverage.
5 Final Remarks
Imposing USO to one, or several rms operating in a formerly regulated
industry raises many questions, some positive, other normative. In this pa-
per we addressed a positive one: what is the impact of USO on the nature
of price competition and thereby on the extent of market coverage by the
entrant? This question is admittedly not a novel one and several important
papers already tackle the issue, most notably Valletti et al. (2002). These
papers emphasize the strategic links that results from the imposition of USO
on the incumbent rms. USO weaken price competition because USO pe-
17nalize the incumbent from ghting in the contested markets through the
monopoly revenues lost on the protected ones. The entrant in turn may
take benet from this strategic link by controlling for the incumbent's ag-
gressiveness through its own choice of market coverage. We argue however
that the previous analysis did not push this nice intuition to its end by ne-
glecting the fact that under low market coverage the willingness to retreat
in the protected markets could actually lead to the non-existence of an equi-
librium (in pure strategies).11 In this paper, we show that this problem is
almost a generic one: whatever the extent of market coverage, there exists
products' characteristics for which the non-existence problem arises. We
show that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, prices are higher on average. As
a consequence, neglecting the existence of these mixed strategy equilibria
amounts to underestimate the anti-competitive consequences of USO. Last,
we show by mean of an example that the entrant's optimal coverage may
indeed lead into the region where mixed strategy equilibria are part of the
equilibrium outcome.
Our results are clearly partial ones. In particular, we have not been able
to characterize completely the structure of mixed strategy equilibria. More
research is called for on this topic and, according to our present analysis,
this research would be particularly welcome to address the full implication
of USO regulations on strategic choices made before price competition takes
place, for instance the choice of products' attributes and/or quality that will
be made available under USO.
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